The eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 triggered a large flow of migrant workers from the new member states to the UK and Ireland. This paper analyzes the impact of this migration wave on the real wages in the source countries. I consider the case of Lithuania, which had the highest share of emigrants relative to its workforce among all ten new member states. Using data from the Lithuanian Household Budget Survey and the Irish Census, I find that emigration had a significant positive effect on the wages of men who stayed in the country, but no such effect is visible for women. A percentage point increase in the emigration rate increases the real wage of men on average by 1%. Several robustness checks confirm this result.
Introduction
If a high number of workers emigrate from a country, this should lead to wage increases for those workers who stay behind. When in 2004 eight countries from central and eastern Europe joined the Europen Union, this triggered a wave of migration from East to West, as workers were able to earn much higher wages in Ireland and the UK than in Poland, Latvia or Lithuania. The question is, whether this emigration wave had an impact on the wages of stayers. An answer to this question can be important for other countries that might join the European Union in the future and whose workers face the same kind of incentives to emigrate. Examples are countries in the Balkan region, such as Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, etc.
In this paper, I test empirically the hypothesis, whether emigration leads to an increase Lithuanian workers registered for a work permit in Ireland and the UK. To identify the impact of emigration on the wages of stayers, I use variation in emigration rates and real wages across gender, education, experience and over time, which follows Borjas (2003) and Mishra (2007) . The data come from the Lithuanian household budget survey, the Irish census, as well as the data on UK and Irish work permits.
Using a reduced-form approach, I find that an increase in emigration is associated with an increase in real wages, but this only holds for certain groups of the workforce. While we cannot see any statistically significant effect for the wages of women, I find a statistically significant positive effect of emigration on the wages of men. When interaction terms are included, it turns out that the effect is higher for unmarried men than for married men.
For a percentage point increase in the emigration rate, the real wages of men increase on average by around 1%. For unmarried men, this effect is 1.5%, while for married men it is close to zero. The results are confirmed by a number of robustness checks. I also adress the question of causality. While I can show that reverse causality is unlikely, it can be the case that the results are driven by a third factor that leads to spurious correlations. In the absence of suitable instruments, an interaction of time and region dummies accounts for this problem, as they absorb factors that can have an impact on wages over time, such as FDI inflows, trade or EU strucutral funds. Given the fact that the inclusion of those fixed effects does not change the statistical significance and magnitude of the effects, this indicates a causal relationship. This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the wage effects of emigration. Mishra (2007) analyzed in a careful empirical study the impact of emigration on wages in Mexico over a time period of 30 years and found a significant positive effect. Batista (2007) developed a dynamic macro model to analyze the contribution of capital flows and emigration to the convergence of Portuguese real wages to EU average after the country's EU accession. She only found a small contribution of emigration. Kaczmarczyk et al. (2009) study the migration impact on Poland and Hazans & Philips (2009) analyze descriptively the situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They find a higher number in vacancies after 2004, lower unemployment and a higher wage growth. These developments occurred at the same time as migration, but the authors do not attempt to establish a causal relationship.
My paper differs from those papers as it exploits the EU enlargement a natural experiment to show the short-run impact of emigration on the wages of stayers. From the results we can see that this effect can be sizeable in the short run.
The paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the historical context of this study and explains its theoretical underpinnings. In section 3, I describe the identification strategy and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the construction of the dataset.
Section 5 contains the results of the main estimation and robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes. an upper bound to migration. The actual losses to the workforce might be smaller, as not all workers who received a work permit in Ireland and the UK, were actually part of the workforce in the source countries. However, this figure shows that emigration led to sizeable changes in labor supply in Central and Eastern Europe.
Theoretical Considerations
A standard textbook model of a labor market suggests that emigration is a negative labor supply shock that leads to labor shortages, which result in upward pressure for real wages. Considering one single labor market implicitly assumes homogeneity of the workforce or, in other words, perfect substitutability of workers with different skills. This assumption is implausible, as a labor market is usually highly fragmented and the degree of substitutability between different groups of workers depends on the proximity of skills. Workers with the same degree of education are closer substitutes than those with a different education. In a specialized economy, even within an education group, people working in different industries are not perfect substitutes. For example, a solicitor cannot easily replace a physician and vice versa, even though both have a third-level degree.
If we take this heterogeneity of labor market participants and their various degrees of substitutability into account, a theoretical model, such as the one proposed by Card & Lemieux (2001) , predicts that a group of workers that is affected by an emigration shock experiences a higher effect on the wages of its own workers than any other group. As emigration did not occur equally to all skill groups, this variation can be exploited to identify the effect of emigration on real wages.
In their models, Card & Lemieux (2001) and Borjas (2003) assume that capital in this economy is fixed. If capital could fully adjust, migration would lead to capital outflows, as a decrease in labor supply decreases the marginal product of capital. This was not the case in Lithuania. Figure 6 shows that the capital stock in Lithuania was actually growing from 2002 to 2006. 5 In section 3.2, I will describe, how I account for those capital flows in the empirical model.
Empirical Framework

Identification Strategy
To identify the impact of emigration on wages, I use variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups and over time. A skill group is defined by gender, education and work experience. This definition follows the works by Borjas (2003) , Ottaviano & Peri (2006 and Borjas et al. (2008) . The conjecture behind this idea is that workers belonging to the same skill group compete in the same labor market. Those skill groups in the workforce which saw large outflows of workers should have, on average, higher increases in real wages than those groups who did not experience high outflows. This is a feasible identification strategy in the case of Lithuania, as the data about educational attainment of emigrants is available from the Irish census. Their work experience is not directly observable, but it can be calculated from the age and education of the emigrants. The clustering of the workforce in education groups is based on the idea that people within one education group are close substitutes in the labor market, whereas
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I am aware of the possibility that capital could have increased even more in the absence of emigration. However, I consider this effect to be negligible.
people from different education groups are not. In other words, a bricklayer with lower secondary education will hardly be able to replace an engineer with a third-level degree and vice versa.
However, even within a particular education group, workers are not necessarily close substitutes if they differ in work experience, as skill formation does not end with education.
Furthermore, workers acquire job-specific skills at their workplace, so that workers with the same education and a similar work experience are close substitutes on the labor market, whereas those with the same education but different levels of work experience are not. To account for those different degrees of substitutability within workers of the same education group, I cluster the workforce in three education and nine experience groups.
The education groups are lower secondary school and less, upper secondary school and third-level degree. The experience groups are clusters of work experience intervals of five years, i.e. 0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years and so on. As the choice of those 5-year intervals is arbitrary, I will also use 2-year and 10-year clusters for robustness checks.
Section A.1 explains the clustering method in detail. the Irish census about their current occupation in Ireland, but this allows no conclusion about their previous occupation in Lithuania. As Kahanec et al. (2009, p. 20) show, immigrants from the new EU member states after 2004 often took up jobs in the receiving countries for which they were actually over-qualified.
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See, for example Altonji & Card (1991) and Friedberg (2001) 
Empirical Specification
The basic empirical specification essentially follows Friedberg (2001) , who uses individuallevel data to investigate the impact of immigration in two-digit occupation categories on real wages in Israel. Instead of occupations, I use worker skill groups as proposed by Borjas (2003) . As migration was triggered by a law change, I assume that it is exogenous to changes in wages throughout the analysis.
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The basic empirical specification used throughout the paper is
where ln w i ghjt denotes the log monthly real wage 8 of individual i. m ghjt is the emigration rate of the skill group individual i belongs to. A skill group is composed of the following characteristics: gender g (g=male, female), education h (h= lower secondary, upper secondary, third-level ) and experience group j (j= 0-4 years, 5-9 years,...,35-39 years, 40+ years). t is the relevant year of the cross-section (t=2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) . The emigration rate m ghjt is a group variable that has the same value for all members of the group in each year. Although all members of the group may not be affected by emigration to the same extent, it is plausible that they are affected in a similar way. Hence, I
expect the standard errors of the members of a particular group to be serially correlated.
This can lead to biased estimates, as reported standard errors can be much lower than they in fact are. 9 To overcome this bias, I cluster the standard errors on the level of gender-education-experience-time cells.
10 Throughout the whole analysis, I only consider workers in the private sector. The argument for this is that the wage setting process in the public sector can be influenced by factors that cannot be explained by competition,
I will discuss potential criticisms of this assumption in section 5.2.
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Monthly wages are deflated by the Lithuanian HCPI. See table 1g) for the HCPI. educ h is a dummy for each education group h. It captures unobservable characteristics that are common to the members of each education group and that do not change over time. For example, workers with a third-level degree tend to work in white-collar occupations, whereas workers with a lower secondary education rather have blue-collar jobs.
The choice of those jobs influences their earnings, but we cannot observe the individual's occupation from the Lithuanian data. A similar selection pattern might occur among workers with different levels of work experience. Within an occupation, older workers might have different tasks than younger workers. This difference can affect their wages.
These time-invariant unobservable characteristics of different experience groups are captured by the experience group dummies exp j .
All regressions are weighted with sampling weights given in the HBS. A sampling weight is defined as the inverse of the probability that an observation is included in the sample.
The use of those weights becomes necessary, as some groups are over-and underrepre-sented in the sample compared to the population. This sampling design of the survey would lead to biased estimates. The weighting of all regressions with those sampling weights eliminates this bias.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The core dataset used in this study is the annual Lithuanian Household Budget Survey, The variables of interest throughout the whole study are real wages and emigration rates.
The real wages can be taken from the Lithuanian HBS. The emigration rates per skill group are not directly observable and have to be calculated using information from different data sources. I take the skill distribution of Lithuanian emigrants from the Irish census data. As there is no microdata about Lithuanian emigrants to the UK available to me, I assume that the skill distribution of migrants to the UK is the same as the skill distribution of migrants to Ireland. As the total inflows of Lithuanian workers, measured from the numbers of work permits differ between Ireland and the UK, I assume that the flows to the UK per skill group are directly proportional to the flows to Ireland. The number of work permits in the UK relative to the number of work permits in Ireland in a given year describes this proportion. To obtain the emigration rates, the number of emigrants in a skill group is divided by the number of people in the Lithuanian workforce, who belong to the same skill group. In section A.2, I describe the calculation of emigration rates and discuss the necessary assumptions in detail. I also explain the cleaning of the data in section A.3.
The following sections give a description about the data sources used in this study.
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey
The Lithuanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) is an annually conducted survey of 7000-8000 households. It includes individual characteristics of household members as well as the income and expenditure of the household. The HBS is representative at the individual level.
To match the Lithuanian data with the Irish census data, I restrict the sample to all employees aged 18-64. The variables taken into consideration are income from employment of the household head and her personal characteristics, such as gender, marital status, the number of children, etc. Self-employed workers are dropped from the sample, as their income is decomposed in the HBS into several income categories which are not easily traceable for most observations. The data on income is self-reported and could as such be subject to misreporting. This does not seem to be the case for the Lithuanian HBS. Table 1j ) compares the average self-reported income for men and women from the HBS with the average income reported by the Lithuanian statistical office, and we can conclude that misreporting should not be an issue. At the same time, the share of workers with lower secondary education is higher in among immigrants in Ireland. This difference in the educational distribution indicates a pattern of negative selection of migrants.
PPS and NINo numbers
As described above, the Irish census data can be used to determine the characteristics of Lithuanian emigrants. However, the figures of the census are only a lower bound to emigration numbers, as they are considerably lower than the figures reported by the The number of immigrants can generally be overstated in the PPS and NINo numbers, as some Lithuanians might be registered in both countries. I will use the PPS and NINo numbers as weights in the calculation of emigration rates in section A.2, taking into consideration that they are an upper bound to migrant numbers and may contain double counts as well as workers who stayed abroad for a very short period in time, e.g. for a summer job.
Basic Results
I estimate the fixed-effect model in equation (1) with OLS, for which Table 3 (panel A) shows the regression results. The basic results, including all private sector workers are displayed in column (1). Controlling for observable and unobservable worker characteristics, I find a positive and statistically significant effect of emigration on real wages.
In economic terms, the coefficient of the emigration rate means that an increase in the emigration rate of a certain gender-education-experience group by one percentage point, increases the wages of this group on average by 0.66%. As we can see, men have on average higher earnings than women, the same holds for people living in an agglomeration Within the population, different groups of the labor force may be affected differently by emigration, for example men more than women, married people more than unmarried.
To account for different wage effects for men and women, I include interaction terms of the emigration rate with the dummy for male (see table 3, column (2)). Furthermore, as unmarried people tend to be more mobile than married people and might differ in unobservable characteristics, the wage effect might differ for married and unmarried people.
I account for this difference in table (3) column (3) with an additional interaction of the emigration rate with the dummy for married. This allows me to analyze the wage effects for four different groups: married women, unmarried women, married men, unmarried men.
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The agglomeration dummy equals 1 if the person lives in one of the five largest cities of Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Panevezys) and zero otherwise. Considering the different effects for married and unmarried people, we can see that there is no visible effect for women. For men, we can see a sizeable difference in the effects of emigration on their real wages between unmarried and married men. At the same time, unmarried men saw their real wages increase on average by 1.4% for every percentage point increase in the emigration rate, while for married men, this effect is close to zero.
Despite the fact that the effect for married men is statistically highly significant, the size of the effect is economically negligible.
The difference in the wage effect for married and unmarried men can have a number of reasons. Of course, there are no distinct labor markets for both groups. The higher wage effect for unmarried men might be driven by observable and unobservable characteristics.
Unmarried men are more flexible and have lower moving costs, which gives them a higher bargaining power towards their employers. They can use the possibility of emigration as a credible threat. Moreover, unmarried men are on average younger than married men. If
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Around 40% of all female workers are employed in the public sector, while the share of male workers is only 20%. Source: Statistics Lithuania
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See the coefficients for the male dummy in table 3, column (3). Even in the absence of migration, men earn on average more than women.
younger workers have higher wage increases than older workers, this translates into higher wage increases for unmarried men. 16 Another unobservable characteristic could be the type of profession married and unmarried people choose. Married people might be more conservative and choose jobs that give them security but are not subject to high wage increases, whereas unmarried men might rather pick jobs that are riskier but experience higher wage increases.
Robustness Checks
Do the Results Suffer from Reverse Causality?
As the results in section 5.1 are derived using OLS, they measure a correlation between emigration and wages. However, a causal interpretation of emigration on wages is only possible, if we can exclude reverse causality. In our case, reverse causality would mean that wages drive emigration. This is certainly possible and would lead to biased estimates.
As I cannot entirely exclude reverse causality, it is important to understand the direction of the bias. As it turns out, reverse causality leads to a downward bias in the estimates of the parameter δ in equation (1). As a consequence, the coefficients obtained in the regressions in section 5.1 reflect a lower bound to the actual effects, so that the effect is at least as great as δ. This can be shown as follows:
Take a simplified version of the model in equation (1),
where u is an error term. In case emigration drives wages, the coefficient δ should be positive, as stayers become a more scarce resource because of higher emigration, which
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As the variation of emigration rates and wage changes across experience groups is central to the identification strategy, I do not test for a difference in wage increases for workers of different age.
leads to an increase in their wages. On the other hand, if we regress emigration rates on wages, the regression becomes
with v being the error term. The direction of the bias then depends on the sign of the coefficient γ. If wages were driving emigration, I would expect a negative relationship between wages and emigration, so that γ < 0: the lower the wages are, the higher the number of emigrants. If those two effects work at the same time, we can add equations 2 and 3. Solving for ln w, we get
As we can see from this equation, δ >
, which is valid as γ < 0, so that the estimate of the coefficient δ in equation (1) is a lower bound to the effect of emigration on wages.
Are the Results Driven by a Third Factor?
Even if reverse causality is not an issue, the correlations found in table 3 may not lead to a causal interpretation, if there is a third factor that drives migration and wages at the same time. In case of the EU eastern enlargement, this situation is likely. The accession of Lithuania did not only trigger a wave of emigration, the country could also benefit from a deeper trade integration, increased FDI inflows, domestic investment and the inflows of EU structural funds. Economic theory implies that those factors, trade and capital inflows, increase labor demand, which translates into higher wages. Hence, the correlation obtained from the OLS estimates might be spurious and does not lead to any conclusion about causality. One way to overcome this problem would be the use of instrumental variables. However, in the context of the European enlargement it is difficult to find suitable instruments, which are correlated with the emigration rate and not correlated with wages, as the EU accession changed the economic conditions from one day to another, so that most variables will be correlated with wage changes.
Another problem that arises in OLS regressions when we do not control for additional variables that drive wages, is omitted variable bias. Without the use of instrumental variables, this bias cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be reduced, either by the inclusion of appropriate fixed effects or by the inclusion of observable control variables, which have an effect on wages, such as FDI or trade. In equation (1) and in all subsequent robustness checks, I include an interaction between a set of region dummies and a set of time dummies. These interactions absorb changes in wages across regions over time and as such, they absorb the variation that is caused by changes in labor demand over time.
The rationale behind this is that demand factors like inflows of FDI and EU structural funds, as well as trade flows, have a different effect on every region and on the wage level in this region.
As a robustness check, I omit the interaction region*year from equation (1) should be greater in the latter case.
Did the Migrants Emigrate out of Unemployment?
The increased mobility for Lithuanian workers after EU accession made it also possible for unemployed people to emigrate and look for work in Ireland and the UK. 
Do the Emigration Rates of other Skill Groups Have an Effect?
The wages of a certain skill group do not only depend on the labor supply of this particular skill group, but also on the labor supply of other skill groups. If different skill groups enter the aggregate production function of an economy as separate labor inputs, a negative labor supply shock to one cell leads to a decreasing marginal product of all the other cells and therefore lowers wages. To account for this interdependence between different skill groups, I augment the specification in equation (1) as follows:
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The HBS does not contain information about the number of return migrants by skill group.
where m ghkt are the emigration rates of all other experience groups within education group j. m ghkt are the emigration rates of the same experience group j but a different education group h. 21 Table 5a ) reports the results for the regressions of equation (5).
The sign and significance of the coefficients for the different groups are the same as in the basic model. The effect of emigration on the real wages of men comes out slightly smaller than in section 5.1, but the robustness check generally confirms the previous results.
Do the results depend on the calculation of skill groups?
So far, I have controlled for a worker's experience by including dummies for experience groups. In the literature, work experience often enters the econometric model as a continous variable. 22 This makes it possible to account for diminishing marginal returns to work experience by including a squared term. The empirical specification for this is
where exp i is the work experience of individual i. The results are displayed in table 5b) and do not differ a lot from the ones in section 5.1.
In section 5.1, the workforce was clustered in 5-year work experience groups under the assumption that within an experience group, workers are perfect substitutes. The choice of those intervals, though widely used in the literature, is purely arbitrary. To check, whether the results are driven by the way the skill groups are clustered, I re-run specification (1), using 2-year and 10-year experience groups. The results can be seen in tables 5d) and 5e). In terms of sign and significance, the coefficients are equivalent to the ones obtained in section 5.1. The marginal effects of the 2-year cells are smaller than for
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Due to multicollinearity issues, it is not possible to include the emigration rates from all other gender-education-experience groups.
the 10-year cells. This difference can be due to the fact that 2-year cells allow for more variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups.
Interaction year*education
When Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, this accession did not only trigger an emigration wave, but the country also got access to EU structural funds and received higher FDI inflows. These factors can increase labor demand and as such have an impact on wages. In the basic specification of equation (1), I attempted to capture those factors by including time fixed effects and an interaction of region and time dummies. The time dummies capture unobservable effects on the average wages of all workers in a given year. The interaction region*year captures unobservable heterogeneous drivers of wage changes across regions over time. However, neither the time dummies nor the interaction accounts for heterogeneous changes in wages across education groups over time. The EU structural funds benefited particularly sectors that employ low-skilled workers, such as the construction sector. In this case, the inflow of structural funds would have a greater impact on the wages of low-skilled workers than on the ones of high-skilled workers. These unobservable heterogeneous wage changes for different education groups over time can be captured by an interaction of the time dummies with the dummies for education groups.
As we can see in table 5c), the effect of emigration on the real wages is slightly smaller, but in terms of sign and significance, this robustness check confirms the findings from section 5.1.
Conclusion
In this paper I exploit a natural experiment to estimate the impact of emigration on stayers. I choose Lithuania for my case study, which lost a high share of its workforce due to emigration after the country's EU accession. The main result in this paper is that there is a positive effect of emigration on the wages of stayers. However, this effect is not significant for all groups of the workforce. While the wages of men increased significantly due to emigration, I cannot find such an effect for women. The use of interaction terms revealed that the increase in wages was higher for unmarried men than for married men.
These results are plausible, as unmarried men are more flexible than married men, which
gives them a higher likelihood to emigrate. If this translates into a higher bargaining power, their wages will increase more than the wages of other groups.
The results turn out to be robust subject to a number of robustness checks. In the absence of appropriate instruments, the question of a causal relationship between emigration and wages can only be answered indicatively. Given that the EU accession was an exogenous event and given that we control appropriately for other factors that might influence migration and wages, the causality of emigration increasing wages seems likely.
While in this study I was only able to account for capital flows using fixed effects, it would be interesting to investigate the contribution of capital flows to the changes in wages after
2004. For such a study, a structural model such as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006 is needed. This could be the subject of future research.
errors are mine.
A Data
A.1 Clustering: Education-Experience Groups
A.1.1 Education Groups
The Lithuanian education system offers a variety of educational tracks and degrees. I define the education groups as follows: Lower secondary school and less, upper secondary school and third-level degree.
Lower Secondary School and Less People with 10 years of schooling or less. As the Lithuanian HBS contains very few observations with primary school education or less, I merge these with the category lower secondary school. Therefore, in terms of the Lithuanian classification, this category includes highschool dropouts, workers who only finished primary school, those with a basic school leaving certificate (usually obtained at the age of 16) and those who pursued stage I of vocational training, which also leads to a basic school leaving certificate. In the Irish census, this group consists of primary school and less and lower secondary school.
Upper secondary school This category includes all workers having a degree higher than a basic school leaving certificate (i.e. at least 11 years of schooling), but do not hold a degree that would allow them to enter a masters' programme at a university in Lithuania or abroad. The dominant degree in this category is the Lithuanian A-level, usually obtained at the age of 18. The other degrees of this category are stages II, III and IV of vocational training and certificates from non-university third-level institutions.
In the Irish census, this category contains all workers with an upper secondary school degree or a third-level education that does not lead to a university degree.
Third-level degree All workers with at least 15 years of schooling and a degree that enables them to apply for a university masters' degree in Lithuania or abroad. Workers with a masters' or a PhD degree are also included here.
A.1.2 Experience Groups
Within each education group, I cluster the workforce by groups of work experience.
Following Borjas (2003) , workers of five consecutive years of work experience form one experience group: workers with 0-4 years of experience, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, etc. up to the group 40+ years. The work experience is not directly observable from the Irish census data, but can be calculated. Assuming that people enter the labor market right after completion of their education, the work experience is calculated according to the formula exper i = age i − educ i − 6, where age i is the age of individual i, educ i is the duration of her highest education individual i has finished and children usually enter school at the age of 6. educ i equals 10 years for workers with lower secondary school, 12 years with upper secondary school and 15 years with a third-level degree.
A.2 Calculation of Emigration Rates
Although the number of emigrants in each education-experience cell is not directly observ- The first assumption implicitly claims that no sorting behavior among migrants between the two destinations Ireland and the UK could be noticed. This assumption is backed by the recent literature on immigration to Ireland and the UK. When we compare the descriptive statistics of the studies by Barrett & Duffy (2008, p.605) whereas in Ireland this share is only 5%. This result could lead to the conclusion that migrants in the UK differed in their skills from those in Ireland. On the other hand, the same study shows that in both countries around 80% of Lithuanian migrants work in sectors that typically employ less-skilled workers, such as construction, health, trade, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants and agriculture. This indicates the absence of sorting behavior, so that it is reasonable to assume that the skill distribution of Lithuanian immigrants is the same in Ireland and the UK. (2002, 2006) , the calculated number of emigrants 
25 N IN O2003 P P S2002 actually consists of two factors:
P P S2003 , which accounts for the size of migrant flows to the UK relative to Ireland and For my econometric analysis, emigration rates are more relevant than absolute emigrant numbers, as the coefficient δ in equation (1) can then be interpreted as a quasi-elasticity.
An increase in the emigration rate of one percentage point would then increase the real wage by δ percent.
The emigration rate m ghjt for cell ghj in year t is
where M t ghj denotes the number of emigrants calculated in equations (7) 
A.3 Data Cleaning
Additional to the data cleaning mentioned in section 4, I made the following changes in the respective datasets:
Irish census
• Dropped observations if age is less than 18 years
• Calculated emigration numbers are rounded to full digits
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The sampling weight p ghijt is the inverse probability that observation i is included in the sample.
• Disposable income less than 0
• Socioeconomic status "pensioner" or not reported
• Less than 18 and more than 64 years old
• Workers, whose income is neither from employment nor self-employment
• Workers who own a farm or are self-employed 
